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Abstract In the framework of finite games in extensive form with perfect
information and strict preferences, this paper introduces a new equilibrium
concept: the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium (PPE).
In the Nash paradigm, rational players consider that the opponent’s strat-
egy is fixed while maximizing their payoff. The PPE, on the other hand, mod-
els the behavior of agents with an alternate form of rationality that involves
a Stackelberg competition with the past.
Agents with this form of rationality integrate in their reasoning that they
have such accurate logical and predictive skills, that the world is fully transpar-
ent: all players share the same knowledge and know as much as an omniscient
external observer. In particular, there is common knowledge of the solution of
the game including the reached outcome and the thought process leading to
it. The PPE is stable given each player’s knowledge of its actual outcome and
uses no assumptions at unreached nodes.
This paper gives the general definition and construction of the PPE as a
fixpoint problem, proves its existence, uniqueness and Pareto optimality, and
presents two algorithms to compute it. Finally, the PPE is put in perspective
with existing literature (Newcomb’s Problem, Superrationality, Nash Equilib-
rium, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Backward Induction Paradox, Forward
Induction).
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1 Introduction
In non-cooperative game theory, one of the most common equilibrium concepts
is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) (Selten 1965), a refinement of the
Nash Equilibrium (Nash 1951). The SPE is defined for dynamic games with
perfect information, which are mostly represented in their extensive form.
The extensive form represents the game as a tree where each node cor-
responds to the choice of a player, and each leaf to a possible outcome of
the game associated with a payoff distribution. This embodies a Leibnizian
account of rational choice in a possible-worlds system. The SPE is obtained
by backward induction, i.e. by first choosing at the leaves (in the future) and
going backward to the root.
While the Nash equilibrium is widely accepted by the game theory com-
munity, there is also a large consensus that it does not account for all real-life
scenarios. This is because people do not always act rationally in situations
where their emotions impact their decisions, but also because different peo-
ple may have different forms of rationality, Nash describing one of them. The
Perfect Prediction Equilibrium (PPE), presented in this paper, is based on
a different form of rationality and accounts for real-life situations that Nash
does not predict, such as asynchronous exchange or promise keeping.
1.1 Two forms of rationality
A crucial assumption made by the Nash equilibrium in general and the SPE in
particular is that each player considers the other player’s strategy to be inde-
pendent of their own strategy. Concretely, this means that the other player’s
strategy is held for fixed while optimizing one’s strategy. In the extensive form,
it means that, at each node, the player whose turn it is to play considers that
former moves (especially the other player’s former moves) and her own current
choice are independent of each other. Consequently, the past can be taken out
of the picture and only the remaining subtree is used to decide on the current
move. This motivates Backward Induction reasoning.
This line of reasoning is intuitive to many, because the past is causally
independent of the future — which is supported by the fact that nothing has
been observed in nature so far that would contradict it.
However, concluding that a rational player must make this assumption
would be fallacious, as this relies on a confusion commonly made between
causal dependency on one side, and counterfactual dependency on the other
side. There are concrete examples of situations where two causally independent
events are counterfactually dependent on each other. This is often referred to
as a statistical dependency in physics (consider quantum measurements done
Perfect Prediction Equilibrium 3
on two entangled photons), and which is of a nature fundamentally different
than that of causality.
The relationship between a move and its anticipation has been at the core
of numerous discussions in game theory. There is an apparent conflict between
a player’s freedom to make any choice on the one hand, and the other player’s
skills at anticipating the moves of his opponent on the other hand.
The Nash equilibrium addresses this tension with the approach described
a few paragraphs above. Though, having a different model on the relationship
between the past moves and the current move can lead to a different form
of rationality that is no less meaningful than the Nash equilibrium approach.
A rational player could consider that her decisions are transparent to, and
anticipated by former players, and, hence, that she might want to integrate into
her reasoning the past’s reaction to her anticipated current move. Concretely,
this means that a player reasoning that way would think of her relationship
with the past not through a Cournot-like competition (that would be the Nash
reasoning), but rather through a Stackelberg-like competition (that would be
the reasoning in this paper) 1.
Newcomb’s problem (see Section 2.2) illustrates that both approaches (Cour-
not-like, Stackelberg-like) are commonly taken by people in the real world, and
that people can feel very strong taking one side or the other. This problem sets
up a very simple situation with an action in the past (predicting and filling
boxes) and a move in the present (picking one or two boxes), and on purpose
leaves open how they depend on each other. Newcomb’s problem demonstrates
that some people (the two-boxers) make the assumption that past actions are
counterfactually independent of their own moves, which corresponds to what
could be called two-boxer rationality (Cournot competition with the predic-
tor). Maybe this explains why most game theoreticians are in this category.
However, many other people (the one-boxers) consider that past actions and
their own moves are counterfactually dependent – entangled. Making this as-
sumption is no less rational, as their line of reasoning then comes down to
optimizing their utility as well, with a Stackelberg view of the relationship
with the predictor’s action.
This Stackelberg competition with the past by no means takes away the
agents’ freedom to make decisions, nor does it break the laws of physics: the
dependency with the past is purely based on counterfactual reasonings such
as ”If I were to make this move, the other player would have predicted it and
acted in this other way.” There is no such thing as a causal impact on the past
or as changing the past.
Let us call this alternate form of rationality one-boxer rationality 2.
1 The analogy with Cournot vs. Stackelberg is used to help understand the paradigm
shift underlying the PPE. Classically, Stackelberg competition is built on the future’s re-
action function. In the PPE, we mean Stackelberg competition built on the past’s reaction
function, which means the reaction function of the past to the anticipation of a move, em-
bedding excellent anticipation skills of the opponent, as opposed to a frozen past in the
Nash paradigm.
2 Asking an agent how many boxes he would pick in Newcomb’s problem is one of the
most convenient ways to tell the difference between the two kinds of rationalities. Hence, we
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Most equilibria in game theory are refinements of the Nash equilibrium.
They account for the behavior of players that are two-boxer-rational, while
little work has been done for one-boxer-rational players. This paper introduces
the solution concept corresponding to the equilibrium reached by one-boxer-
rational players: the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium (PPE).
1.2 The assumptions
This paper defines a solution concept for games that are:
in extensive form, i.e., the game is represented by an explicit tree, rather than
by a flat set of strategies for each player; The game structure is Common
Knowledge.
with perfect information, meaning that for each choice they make, players
know at which node they are in the tree;
with strict preferences3, meaning that given two outcomes, players are never
indifferent between those;
played by rational players, in its widely accepted meaning in game theory, i.e.,
they are logically smart and play to the best of their interests, preferences
and knowledge with the goal of maximizing their utility; The player’s ra-
tionality is Common Knowledge.
played by agents with a one-boxer form of rationality – that is, with a Stack-
elberg account of the past’s reaction, which is the novelty of this paper.
The one-boxer rationality of the players is Common Knowledge as well.
We are interested in games exclusively played by one-boxer-rational agents.
Past moves are considered to be counterfactually dependent on the current
player’s move: Would a player play differently than he actually does, then it
would be the rational thing to do, and the other player would have anticipated
it. This leads to a form of Stackelberg competition where the current player
considers the past’s reaction function. The reaction function can be seen as
literally reading each other’s minds (or at least, as believing that the other
player does so, which is sufficient). These players consider that there is Com-
mon Knowledge (CK) of the solution of the game: CK of the outcome of the
game and of each other’s thought processes. Hence, one-boxer rationality can
also be seen as the belief that the world is totally transparent, and that the
players have as much knowledge as an omniscient external observer (Perfect
Prediction).
use the terms “one-boxer rational” for agents that would pick one box, and that would reach
the PPE in an extensive-form game, and “two-boxer rational” for agents that would pick
both boxes, and would reach the SPE in an extensive-form game. Other possibilities would
be Nash rational vs. fixpoint rational, projected time rational vs. occuring time rational,
etc.
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1.3 Outline of the paper
In the remainder of this paper, and for the sake of a smooth read, we will
consider, like the one-boxer-rational players, that it holds that the world is
totally transparent and that there is CK of the solution (i.e., of all actual
moves) of the game, embracing their account of the world.
Our starting point is the question: if there were an equilibrium which is
totally transparent to itself, what would it be?
Starting with the Perfect Prediction abilities (assumed by the players), two
principles are postulated (1. Preemption, 2. Rational Choice).
Using these two principles, we can show that the equilibrium reached by
one-boxer-rational players, and which we call Perfect Prediction Equilibrium
(PPE), exists and is unique. Hence, this answers the question asked above:
assuming that there is an equilibrium totally transparent to itself, then it is
necessarily the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium. Furthermore, because of its
uniqueness, the players, aware of the assumptions, are able to unambiguously
calculate the PPE and react accordingly, which leads them to this very equilib-
rium and makes their prediction correct (self-fulfilling prophecy). This closes
the loop: the PPE is totally transparent to itself.
In addition, the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium happens to have the prop-
erty of Pareto-optimality: there is no other outcome giving a better payoff to
both players.
Hence, all conjectures (existence, uniqueness, Pareto-optimality) made by
Dupuy (2000) are proven in this paper for the PPE.
In Section 2, we introduce Newcomb’s problem as an illustration of the
importance of assuming (or not) counterfactual independence. We then ex-
plain the relationship between total transparency and Perfect Prediction. We
posit two principles, which we apply to some examples. In Section 3, we give
the general definition of the PPE as well as its construction, and prove its
existence, uniqueness and Pareto optimality. Finally, Section 4 gives links to
existing literature on Superrationality, the Backward Induction Paradox, and
Forward Induction4. In the annex, we provide more technical background for
readers interested in deeper details, such as the analysis of the underlying pre-
emption structure of the PPE, from which two algorithms can be derived to
compute it. The annex also gives complementary material such as proofs of the
lemmas and theorems, a complete analysis of biped games, and the equations
behind the PPE.
4 In our paper, we use the expression “forward induction” with two meanings. The first
one is forward induction by construction: reasoning starts at the root and finishes at an
outcome. The second one is the meaning that Forward Induction has accumulated in the
history of game theory and which is explained in Section 4. For clarity, we refer to the former
without capitals “forward induction”, and to the latter with capitals “Forward Induction”.
6 Ghislain Fourny et al.
2 Perfect Prediction
Before giving the formal definition of the PPE and proving its properties, we
focus on a few examples, explain the general semantics of Perfect Prediction
and of the PPE, and show how it applies to these examples.
2.1 Examples used throughout this paper
There are three games used repeatedly as examples in this paper.
2.1.1 Take-or-Leave game
The Take-or-Leave game is represented on Fig. 1 and goes as follows: “A
referee places dollars on a table one by one. He has only n dollars. There are
two players who play in turn. Each player can either take the dollars that have
accumulated so far, thereby ending the game, or leave the pot on the table, in
which case the referee adds one dollar to it, and it’s the other player’s turn to
move.”
The original TOL game does not satisfy the strict preference assumption5,
so that this example was slightly modified in such a way that the loser of the
game still gets increasing payoffs. This does not modify its (inefficient as we
will see) Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
Fig. 1 The Take-Or-Leave game (n is odd)
This type of game has often been used to describe the Backwards Induction
Paradox in literature (see Section 4.1).
2.1.2 Assurance game
The assurance game (see Fig. 2) models a basic, asynchronous, Pareto-im-
proving exchange in economics (payoffs are utilities). The rule is as follows.
First, Peter has the choice between deviating (D - both players get 0) and
cooperating (C). If Peter cooperates, then Mary has the choice between co-
operating as well (C), in which case both players get 1, and deviating (D), in
which case Mary gets 2 and Peter gets −1.
5 However, once familiar with the PPE, the reader may notice that this assumption can
sometimes be relaxed, and that the original TOL game does have a PPE, too
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Fig. 2 The assurance game
This can be interpreted as the possibility for Peter to trust Mary or not,
and if he does trust her, Mary can choose to cooperate or not.
2.1.3 Γ -game
Fig. 3 The Γ -Game
The Γ -game (see Fig. 3) aims at demonstrating how the PPE is computed
on a slightly more complex game. First, Peter has the choice between two
nodes. If he chooses n1, then Mary chooses between two outcomes; if he chooses
n2, Mary chooses between two nodes and it is Peter’s turn again. This game
does not have a particular interpretation - it was simply designed for the
reasoning to be interesting and to help the reader understand how the Perfect
Prediction Equilibrium works on general trees.
2.2 Newcomb’s Problem
Newcomb’s problem (Gardner 1973) is an illustration of how the concepts of
prediction and decision interact, and a good starting point to introduce Per-
fect Prediction. In particular, it is a very good test for distinguishing between
agents with two kinds of rationalities that differ by the correlation, or absence
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thereof, between prediction and decision. Historically, Newcomb’s problem,
through the research and literature around it, is actually at the origin of the
discovery of these two kinds of rationalities, which is why, in this paper, we
decided to call them one-boxer rationality and two-boxer rationality, the latter
being the one commonly accepted as game-theoretical perfect rationality. The
use of these names, however, by no means reduces the scope of these ratio-
nalities to Newcomb’s problem and alternate names are suggested in footnote
2.
Imagine two boxes. One, B, is transparent and contains a thousand dollars;
the other, A, is opaque and contains either a million dollars or nothing at all.
The choice of the agent is either C1: to take only what is in the opaque box,
or C2: to take what is in both boxes. At the time that the agent is presented
with this problem, a Predictor has already placed a million dollars in the
opaque box if and only if he foresaw that the agent would choose C1. The
agent knows all this, and he has very high confidence in the predictive powers
of the Predictor. What should he do?
A first line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the agent should
choose C1. The Predictor will have foreseen it and the agent will have a million
dollars. If he chose C2, the opaque box would have been empty and he would
only have a thousand. The paradox is that a second line of reasoning (taken
by most game theorists as it is consistent with Nash) appears to lead just as
surely to the opposite conclusion. When the agent makes his choice, there is
or there is not a million dollars in the opaque box: by taking both boxes, he
will obviously get a thousand dollars more in either case. This second line of
reasoning applies dominance reasoning to the problem, whereas the first line
applies to it the principle of maximization of expected utility.
The paradox can be solved as follows (although, to be fair, there is to
date no established consensus about it). Two-boxers assume that the choice
and the prediction are counterfactually independent of each other. In other
words, once the prediction is made, the choice is made independently and the
prediction, which lies in the past, is held for fixed. Even if the prediction is
correct (the player gets $ 1,000), it could have been made wrong (she would
have gotten $ 0). One-boxers assume on the contrary that the prediction and
the choice are counterfactually dependent. In other words, the prediction is
correct (player gets $ 1,000,000), and if the player had made the other choice,
the predictor would have correctly anticipated this other choice as well (she
would have gotten $ 1,000).
One-boxers and two-boxers are both rational: they merely make different,
not to say opposite, assumptions. This illustrates that there are at least two
ways of being rational.
A probabilistic illustration along the same lines as this solution has re-
cently been given by Wolpert and Benford (2013). Technically, counterfactual
dependence means statistical dependence if events and decisions are seen as
random variables. It is a symmetrical relation and ignores the arrow of time
(unlike causal dependence).
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The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium makes the (“two-boxer”) assumption
that decisions are counterfactually independent of the past. More generally,
Nash Equilibria make the (“two-boxer”) assumption that the other players’
strategies are held fixed while a single player optimizes her strategy. Perfect
Prediction Equilibria, on the other hand, relies on the “one-boxer” assumption
of counterfactual dependency. In both cases, players are rational and maximize
their utility to the best of their logical abilities. They are, however, rational
in two different ways.
2.3 Transparency and Perfect Prediction
In classical game theory (Nash equilibrium), two-boxer-rational agents know
that they are rational, know that they know, etc. This is called common knowl-
edge (CK) of rationality in literature. Common knowledge is a form of trans-
parency. In the case of SPE, the possible futures are each considered by, and
are transparent to, the current player, for him to decide on his next move.
However, this transparency does not hold the other way round. The player
being simulated or anticipated in a possible future – first and foremost, in a
subgame that is not actually on the path to the SPE – cannot be fully aware
of the rest of the game (that is, of the overall SPE), as this knowledge would
be in conflict with the fact of being playing in the subgame at hand. The past
is opaque to her, meaning that she cannot be fully aware of the past thought
processes. She simply assumes that the past leading to her subgame is fixed,
and the other player knows that she does (CK of two-boxer-rationality). This
is one-way transparency. Section 4.1 goes into more details on what is known
as the backward induction paradox.
It goes otherwise for one-boxer-rational agents. In a game played by one-
boxer-rational agents, there is common knowledge of rationality as well, in
that players know (and know that they know, etc) that they both react to
their knowledge in their best interest. But there is more importantly CK of
one-boxer-rationality, which means that (i) each player considers himself to
be transparent to the past, in that they integrate this very CK of one-boxer-
rationality in their reasoning and consider themselves to be predictable, and
(ii) each player P considers himself to be transparent to the future as well, in
that they know that a future player F considers player P’s moves to correlate
(counterfactually) with their (F’s) decision, whichever way F decides.
This more stringent form of transparency drastically changes the reason-
ing: since transparency goes both ways, the entire solution of the game (all
thought processes, the equilibrium, etc) is CK. In such a perfectly transparent
world, each agent would have the same knowledge of the world as an exter-
nal omniscient spectator, this fact being CK among the agents 6. The players
6 Some might suggest that this could be considered a Principle Zero, in addition to the
two principles described in Section 2.4. Since we consider this to be part of the fundamentals
of the PPE framework though, as opposed to the two principles, which are more algorithmic,
we decided not to call it so.
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(profactually) predict the solution correctly, and would also have (counter-
factually) predicted it correctly if it had been different. This is what we call
Perfect Prediction. This different relation to time was called Projected Time
(and the widespread relation to time Occurring Time) by Dupuy (2000).
Rather than considering all possible futures, the one-boxer-rational agents
assume that there is one solution of the game that is CK, and based on this
assumption, compute and find that very solution of the game that is CK. The
players react to their CK of the outcome of the game, play accordingly and
reach an outcome which is indeed the predicted outcome. This is nothing else
than a fixpoint problem, which can be solved and which has a unique solution,
as demonstrated in this paper.
A side effect of assuming CK of the game solution is that the construction of
the equilibrium in this paper is supported by reasoning only on the equilibrium
path. There is one timeline, and it is completely transparent to itself, by its
definition as a fixpoint.
2.4 Two principles behind the computation of the Perfect Prediction
Equilibrium
A Perfect Prediction Equilibrium is a path on the tree which can be reached
under the assumption of total transparency, or, in other words, by one-boxer
rational players that genuinely believe that there is total transparency.
The computation of PPEs by the players or an external game theorist,
which is the same, is done by eliminating outcomes of the game which lead to
a contradiction (Grandfather Paradox7), i.e., which cannot possibly be com-
monly known as the equilibrium.
At each step of the reasoning, there is CK of the outcomes which are
logically impossible (this is part of the thought process). Using this knowledge,
it is possible to discard additional outcomes which cannot be commonly known
as the equilibrium reached by the game, thanks to the two principles.
2.4.1 First principle
The CK of the outcomes which have been proven logically impossible as well
as the assumed CK of the outcome o reached by the game give the players a
7 The Grandfather Paradox is as follows: a time traveler goes back in time and provokes
the death of his grandfather, preventing him from meeting his grandmother. Hence, the time
traveler was not born and cannot have traveled back in time. While one might see this as a
proof that time travel is impossible, another way to look at it is that the actual timeline is
the solution of a fixpoint equation: the past, tampered with by the time traveler, must cause
the time traveler’s birth for him to be able to go back in time. In terms of game theory, we
also encounter a Grandfather paradox in the following case: an outcome is commonly known
to be the outcome of the game; having predicted it, a player deviates from the path leading
to it, making the outcome out of reach. Just like for the time traveler, we are looking for
the timeline which is immune to the Grandfather paradox: the outcome which is actually
caused by its prediction.
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power of preemption; a player will deviate from the path connecting the root
to o (we call this path causal bridge) if the deviation guarantees to him a better
payoff than o (whatever the continuation of the game after the deviation can
be, and taking into account that some outcomes have been proven logically
impossible).
If such is the case, then o, which is not a fixpoint, cannot be commonly
known as the solution and is logically impossible; it is said to be preempted 8.
We call preemption this process of breaking the causal bridge in reaction to
the anticipation of an outcome (see Fig. 4).
Fig. 4 Illustration of the First Principle
Example 1 Let us take o3 in the assurance game (Fig. 2). There are no out-
comes proven impossible yet. We assume that o3 is the outcome eventually
reached by the game, which is known to the players. For Peter playing at the
root, a deviation from n2 (which is on the path leading to o3) to o1 guarantees
him a better payoff (0) than what he gets with o3 (-1). This means that antic-
ipating o3, Peter deviates and breaks the causal bridge leading to o3. Hence,
o3 cannot be the solution: it is not possible for Peter to predict o3 and to play
towards o3. o3 is preempted and is logically impossible. It can be ignored from
now on.
Example 2 In the Γ -game example, o4 can also be discarded this way: For
Peter playing at the root, a deviation from n1 (which is on the path leading
to o4) guarantees him a better payoff (4, 0, 2, 5 or 3) than what he gets with
o4 (-1). o4 is preempted and can also be ignored from now on.
Principle 1 Let I be the set of the outcomes that have not been discarded yet.
The discarded outcomes are ignored. Let n be a given node which is reached by
8 With the terminology of the introduction, the one-boxer-rational agent forbids himself
to pick o because it would lead to an inconsistency in his reasoning pattern.
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the game and where player p is playing. Let o ∈ I be an outcome among the
descendants of n. o is said to be preempted if all outcomes in one of the non-
empty 9 subtrees at n, give to p a greater payoff than o. A preempted outcome
is logically impossible, is hence discarded and must be ignored in the remainder
of the reasoning.
2.4.2 Second principle
In the assurance game (Fig. 2), given the knowledge that o3 is logically im-
possible, Peter is faced with the choice between o1, which gives him 0, and n2,
which gives him eventually for sure 1 since o3 cannot be chosen. Because he is
rational, he chooses n2. This is the second principle (see Fig. 5).
Fig. 5 Illustration of the Second Principle
Principle 2 Let I be the set of the outcomes that have not been discarded yet.
The discarded outcomes are ignored. Let n be a given node which is reached
by the game and where player p is playing. If all outcomes in one of the non-
empty subtrees at n, of root r, are better than any other outcome in the other
subtrees, then p chooses r. As a consequence, r is also reached by the game,
and all remaining outcomes in other subtrees than the one at r are discarded.
The second principle is only applicable if all outcomes on the one side are
better than all outcomes on the other side. If the payoffs are “interlaced”, it
does not apply - but in this case, the first principle can be used instead.
Also, the second principle applies in the degenerate case where there is
only one unique non-empty subtree. Then the player chooses this subtree.
2.4.3 The reasoning to the equilibrium
Based on the two principles, it is possible to build a system of first-order-
logic equations for each game, as described in the annex (Section 10.5). By
9 i.e., a subtree that only has discarded outcomes cannot be considered
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definition, a PPE is a solution to this system. The equations are divided into
three groups:
1. Application of the First Principle
2. Application of the Second Principle
3. Causal bridge enforcement (i.e. an equilibrium must be a consistent path
starting from the root)
This system can be solved with a technique which turns out to be a forward
induction: one starts at the root, discards all outcomes preempted at this step
with the first principle, then moves on to the next node - there is always exactly
one - with the second principle (this node is now known to be reached by the
game), discards all outcomes preempted at this step with the first principle,
moves on to the next node with the second principle, etc., until an outcome is
reached.
In the reasoning, the list of logically impossible outcomes is initially empty
and grows until no more outcomes can be discarded. In fact, as will be proven
in Section 3, under the assumption of strict preferences, exactly one outcome
remains. The one-boxer rational players have no interest in deviating from
the path leading to it and will play towards it: it is the Perfect Prediction
Equilibrium, which always exists and is unique.
This system of equations can be described formally, however for peda-
gogical reasons, from now on, we will reason directly by performing outcome
eliminations.
The reasoning is totally transparent and can be performed, ahead of the
game or without even playing, by a game theorist or any player, always leading
to the same result. Actually, as the structure of the reasoning is a forward
induction, it would even be possible to perform the reasoning as you go during
the game.
2.5 Computation of the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium for the three
examples
We now show how the forward induction reasoning described above can be
applied to the examples.
2.5.1 Assurance game (Fig. 2)
We begin at the root.
Being Perfect Predictors, the players at the root cannot predict o3 as the
final outcome because of the first principle: the prediction of o3 would lead
Peter to deviate at the root towards o1, which invalidates this very predic-
tion. We say that outcome o3 has been preempted by the o1 move. Therefore,
outcome o3 has been identified as not being part of the solution: it cannot be
commonly known as the outcome reached by the equilibrium and is ignored
from now on.
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This can also be formulated as a reasoning in Mary’s mind. She is one-
boxer rational. Mary includes Peter’s past move as a reaction function to her
choice between o3 and o4. Were she to pick o3, Peter would have anticipated
it as the rational thing for her to do – and he would have picked o1. But this
would be inconsistent with her playing at n2. Since picking o3 is correlated
with a past reaction (to the anticipation of o3) that is incompatible with o3
(Grandfather’s Paradox), she cannot (one-boxer)-rationally pick o3.
Now that o3 is (identified as being) impossible, we are left with o1 and o4,
and we can apply the second principle: Peter knows that Mary is one-boxer
rational and will not pick o3. He can either move to o1 and win 0, or move to
n2 and win 1. He chooses the latter
10 and n2 is known to be reached by the
game.
At n2, Mary, according to a trivial application of the second principle (she
can only choose o4), moves to o4, which is known to be reached by the game:
it is the only remaining outcome. If there is an equilibrium, it is o4.
Fig. 6 The Perfect Prediction Equilibrium in the Assurance Game
Conversely, it is possible to check that this outcome corresponds to an
equilibrium. Predicting o4, Peter will not deviate: according to the second
principle, he moves to n2, i.e., towards o4. Mary will not deviate either, since
she cannot choose o3, which is preempted. More precisely, she forbids to herself
to pick o3 because her reasoning as a one-boxer rational player stamped it as
an illogical move. Like a self-fulfilling prophecy, o4 is reached by the game: it
is the equilibrium (Fig. 6).
10 Some might see a paradox here, since outcome o1 has contributed to the preemption of
o3, but at the same time is impossible because not reached. Actually, there is no paradox.
A proposition (“outcome o3 is part of the solution”) which implies a contradiction (“Peter
deviates, so o3 is not part of the solution”) is false, but this does not imply that a proposi-
tion (“Peter deviates”) implied by this proposition is logically true, since false propositions
logically imply anything, true or false. In the formalization of the PPE as solution of a
first-order-logic equation system, this appears clearly.
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2.5.2 Take-Or-Leave game (Fig. 1)
The previous reasoning can easily be generalized to the Take-Or-Leave-game
(Fig. 1).
One begins at the root. The application of the first principle here leads to
the preemption of o3 because it would be in the interest of Peter to deviate at
node n0 towards o1.
Then, knowing this, according to the second principle, Peter chooses n2,
since all remaining outcomes in this subtree are better (3, 2, 5) than o1 (1),
which is discarded.
At n2, Mary has to take n4 since o3 was proven logically impossible (again,
her line of reasoning as a one-boxer rational player tells her that it would not
be a rational choice).
Then the application of the first principle here leads to the preemption of
o7 because it would be in the interest of Peter to deviate at node n4 towards
o5.
Then, knowing this, according to the second principle, Peter chooses n6,
since all remaining outcomes in this subtree are better (5) than o5 (3), which
is discarded.
At n6, Mary has to take n8 since o7 was proven logically impossible.
At n8, Peter chooses the remaining outcome o9, which is the Perfect Pre-
diction Equilibrium (Fig. 7).
Fig. 7 The Perfect Prediction Equilibrium in the Take-Or-Leave game (n is odd)
2.5.3 Γ -game (Fig. 3)
In this game, the general technique for computing the Perfect Prediction Equi-
librium becomes visible.
We start at the root, where the first principle leads to the preemption of o4
(Peter would deviate to n2 where all payoffs are higher than -1) and then to
the preemption of o8 (Peter would deviate to n1 where all remaining payoffs
are now higher than 0).
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Since the payoffs are no longer interlaced, we can now apply the second
principle. Peter chooses n2 (remaining payoffs: 2, 3, 4, 5) over n1 (1): n2 is
now known to be reached by the game, o3 is discarded (see Fig. 8).
Fig. 8 The Perfect Prediction Equilibrium in the Γ -game
At n2 (where the only remaining outcomes are o7, o9, o10 and o11), we
apply the first principle with Mary: o10 is preempted (Mary would deviate to
n5). Then the second principle applies: Mary chooses n6 (2, 3) over n5 (1). n6
is known to be reached by the game, o7 is discarded.
At n6 (where the only remaining outcomes are o9 and o11), we apply di-
rectly the second principle: Peter chooses o11 (3) over o9 (2).
The game reaches o11. Conversely, the players, anticipating this outcome,
will play towards it: it is the equilibrium.
In fact, the algorithmic procedure will always be the same: identify the
subgame with the worst payoff and preempt its worst outcomes by making use
of other subgames as potential deviations.
3 Construction of the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium
3.1 A general definition
In the former section, we introduced Perfect Prediction, the idea of preemption
and two principles, and constructed the PPE for some examples. We now define
the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium for all games in extensive form, without
chance moves and strict preferences.
We assume that both players are one-boxer rational. They consider that
the solution to the game is CK.
The application of the two principles detailed in Section 2 allows the elim-
ination of all outcomes but one. The remaining, non-discarded outcome is the
Perfect Prediction Equilibrium. It is immune against the CK that the players
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have of it. The two players, having anticipated it, have no interest in modifying
their choices and will play towards this outcome: it is a fixpoint.
Note that the definition of the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in terms of
stability is very similar: it is an equilibrium which is reached when both players
have no interest in modifying their strategy, knowing the other player’s strat-
egy, including what he would do at unreached nodes. In our definition however,
we never consider unreached nodes: the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium is sta-
ble with respect to the knowledge of itself as a path, and only of itself. This
implies that, as opposed to the Nash Equilibrium, there is no sense in talk-
ing of “equilibria in each subgame”. Actually the different subgames of the
tree disappear along the construction of the equilibrium: they are just used as
temporary possible deviations.
We believe that the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium fulfills a stability con-
dition which is simpler, more natural and more compact (self-contained) than
the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. It may be regarded as both normative (be-
cause the Pareto optimality is an incentive to adopt it in the sense that it never
reaches sub-optimal outcomes) and positive (it describes game outcomes en-
countered in real life, like the assurance game).
3.2 The construction of the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium
We consider two-player11 finite games with perfect information, without chance
moves and with strict preferences.
Definition 1 (Labeled tree) A labeled tree is a tree whose root is n0, and
such that:
- each node n, labeled by a player pn, has a set F (n) of offsprings (nodes
or outcomes).
- each leaf is an outcome o labeled by a couple of integers (aPetero , a
Mary
o ).
- all (aPetero )o are distinct and all (a
Mary
o )o are distinct
The label pn at node n indicates whose turn it is to play. The offsprings
F (n) of node n are player pn’s possible choices.
The label (aPetero , a
Mary
o ) at outcome o indicates how much Peter and Mary
get.
For convenience, nodes and outcomes are numbered (n0, n1 or o1, n2 or
o2, ...) so that it is possible to easily refer to them in the examples.
The last part of the definition corresponds to the assumption that each
player has a strict preference between any two outcomes.
We define D(n) as the set of all descendants (nodes and outcomes) of node
n; it is the transitive and reflexive closure of the offspring-relation.
To compare outcomes, we write that o1 <p o2 whenever a
p
o1 < a
p
o2 . When
the player is clear from the context, we will also say that an outcome is better
or worse than another one (meaning for the current player).
11 The formalism can very easily be extended to any number of players. The main difference
is that outcomes are labeled by n-tuples of integers instead of couples.
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Example 3 In the Assurance game, we have two nodes, n0 (the root) and n2,
and three outcomes o1, o3 and o4. The players are pn0 =Peter and pn2=Mary.
F is defined as F (n0) = {o1, n2} and F (n2) = {o3, o4}. The payoffs are
(aPetero1 , a
Mary
o1 ) = (0, 0), (a
Peter
o3 , a
Mary
o3 ) = (−1, 2) and (aPetero4 , aMaryo4 ) =
(1, 1). Peter’s payoffs are all distinct, as well as Mary’s payoffs. D is defined
as D(n0) = {o1, n2, o3, o4} and D(n2) = {o3, o4}.
A very short summary of the construction of the Perfect Prediction Equi-
librium is the following: the reasoning is done by discarding all outcomes which
cannot be CK. We start at the root. The outcomes in all direct subtrees but
one are discarded, as well as some outcomes in the remaining subtree. The
next move has to be the root of the only subtree where at least one outcome
remains. Hence, the next move exists and is unique (Lemma 1). We continue
with the next move and so on, until an outcome is reached, which is the out-
come of the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium.
3.2.1 Initialization, notations: ci and Ii
An equilibrium is a path12 (ci)i=1..d such that the first player starts at c1 = n0,
and at each step i, given ci−1, the next move is ci ∈ F (ci−1).
Formally :
– c1 = n0 (the root)
– ∀i = 1..d− 1, ci is a node
– ∀i = 2..d, ci ∈ F (ci−1)
– cd is an outcome
Example 4 In the Γ -game, the equilibrium is (c1, c2, c3, c4) where c1 = n0, c2 =
n2, c3 = n6, c4 = o11.
At each step i we are also given Ii−1, a subset of the set D(ci−1) of the
outcomes descending from the previous move ci−1. This set Ii−1 is the set of
all outcomes that are immune against their knowledge up to ci−1 (technically
speaking, they have not been discarded yet: the second principle has only been
applied up to ci−1, their common ancestor, and they could not be preempted
with the first principle at any node earlier on the path).
Example 5 In the Γ -game, the sequence would be I1 = {all outcomes},
I2 = {o7, o9, o10, o11}, I3 = {o9, o11}, I4 = {o11}. o7 is in I2 because it is
not discarded, meaning that if Peter at c1 = n0 anticipates o7, he will not
deviate. o8 does not make it in I2 because it is preempted by Peter at n0
according to the first principle. o3 is not in I2 either since it is discarded by
the second principle, as well as all outcomes not in the n2 subtree.
12 We can either consider the equilibrium as the outcome reached by the players, or as the
path leading to it, which is equivalent.
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A node that is not in Ii−1 cannot be commonly known to be reached by the
game, either because it was discarded by the second principle, or because it
would bring about a deviation in the past according to the first principle. Note
that sometimes, when the outcomes in two subtrees are not interlaced, it can
be ambiguous which principle to apply to discard some outcomes: when the
second principle potentially selects a subtree and discards the other outcomes,
then the first principle could also be used instead to preempt the very same
outcomes with this subtree. This leaves room for a philosophical interpretation
(preemption or rational choice), but does not change what outcomes are dis-
carded. This is why, in this section, we will apply the first principle whenever
it applies, and then the second principle, but we will push forward the word
“discard” instead of “preempt” to leave open which principle is used in the
interpretation.
Example 6 In the Γ -game, one could also argue that o3 is not in I2 by invoking
the first principle: o3 is preempted by the n2 move. Even with this interpre-
tation, it changes nothing to the fact that all outcomes not in the n2 subtree
are discarded.
In other words, the outcomes that are not in the set Ii−1 are not to be
taken into account anymore: they have been proven not to fit the definition of
the equilibrium. The other partially fit the definition: they are immune against
their knowledge at least up to ci−1, which means that players will play towards
this outcome at least until ci−1 is reached, but could still deviate later.
At the beginning I1 = {all outcomes}, which means that no outcome has
been discarded yet: c1 is the root and is always reached because the game
starts here (the causal bridge is secured).
At each step, we discard outcomes (with the first principle, or possibly the
second principle for the very last discarding, which is technically equivalent)
until all subtrees but one are completely discarded, and finish with the second
principle which allows us to move on to the next node and the next step.
3.2.2 Newcombian States
At step i, the last move ci−1 and the remaining outcomes Ii−1 are given. For
example at step 2, the last move is the root (c1 = n0) and the remaining
outcomes are all the outcomes (I1 = {all outcomes}), and we are looking for
c2 and I2.
We will now define Newcombian States13 for the player pci−1 (the cur-
rent player) so as to recursively determine the outcomes that are not immune
against their common knowledge because of a deviation at the node ci−1.
These outcomes are discarded at this step.
A Newcombian State has a pure part (corresponding to a possible move)
and a discarding part (a Newcombian State which invalidates some outcomes
13 Newcombian States can be seen as a the mathematical counterpart of a player’s Perfect
Prediction skills. This name has been chosen as a tribute to Newcomb’s Problem (see Section
2.2). To reach the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium, players reason as one-boxers.
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as equilibrium candidates, with one of the two principles). It can be thought of
as a bundle containing a move (its “pure part”) together with the knowledge
and the proof (its “discarding part”) that some of its descendant outcomes are
impossible. The proof that such an outcome is impossible consists of a witness:
the move in the discarding part
– to which the player pi−1 would deviate according to the first principle if
the outcome were predicted.
– or to which the player pi−1 actually goes according to the second principle.
Definition 2 (Newcombian State, pure part, discarding part) At step i, a
Newcombian State of order k, with k ≥ 1, is an element η = (η1, .., ηk) ∈
(F (ci−1))
k
, constituted by offsprings of the last move, such that any two con-
secutive elements are different:
η = (η1, .., ηk) ∈ (F (ci−1))k : ηj 6= ηj+1, j = 1..k − 1 (1)
The pure part of a Newcombian State is its first element: pure(η) = η1 ∈
F (ci−1).
The discarding part of a Newcombian State of order k > 1 is the element
of (F (ci−1))k−1 composed by the k − 1 last elements of η:
discard(η) = (η2, .., ηk) ∈ (F (ci−1))k−1
.
Example 7 In the Γ -game, (n1, n2) is a Newcombian state of order 2. Its pure
part is n1 and its discarding part is n2. n2 is a witness that a descendant
(o4) of n1 is impossible, because it is discarded by the first principle (o4 is
preempted by n2).
Likewise, (n2, n1, n2) is a Newcombian state of order 3. Its pure part is n2
and its discarding part is (n1, n2). The latter is a witness that a descendant
(o8) of n2 is discarded by the first principle (it is preempted by n1 knowing
that o4 is impossible).
Finally, (n1, n2, n1, n2) is a Newcombian state of order 4. Its pure part
is n1 and its discarding part is (n2, n1, n2). The latter is a witness that a
descendant of n1 (o3) is impossible. In this case, it is open whether the second
principle (Peter chooses n2, knowing that o8 and o4 are impossible, which
discards all outcomes in other subtrees) or the first principle (o3 is preempted
by n2 knowing that o8 and o4 are impossible) is applied, liked we mentioned
above. Whichever principle is used, o3 is discarded.
A Newcombian State of order 1 is a pure Newcombian State: no outcome
has been discarded yet (unless it was at a former step, but we said that out-
comes invalidated at a former step are out of the race anyway).
Example 8 (n2) is a pure Newcombian state, i.e., in which no outcomes have
been discarded yet.
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3.2.3 Target function and discarding
Each Newcombian State is associated with the subset of the descendants of
its pure part that are not discarded by its discarding part. This is defined
recursively by making appeal to the target function Ti in the following way:
Definition 3 (Target function and Discarding) At step i,
- if η is a first-order Newcombian State, i.e. η = (η1), then Ti(η) is the set
of outcomes that are among the descendants of η1 and that were not discarded
before step i:
Ti(η) = Ii−1 ∩D(η1)
- if η is a Newcombian State of order k > 1, i.e. η = (η1, p), then Ti(η) is
the set of outcomes that are among the descendants of η1 and that were not
discarded before step i, excluding outcomes worse than the worst14 outcome
in Ti(p) if Ti(p) is not empty.
Every outcome that is excluded that way is called p-discarded. Any out-
come in Ti(η) is said η-targeted. If we denote the set of the p-discarded
outcomes with
Pi(p) = {o ∈ Ii−1 \D(pure(p))|Ti(p) 6= ∅ ∧ ∀o′ ∈ Ti(p), o <pci−1 o′}
then
Ti(η) = (Ii−1 ∩D(η1)) \ Pi(p)
which defines a recursion on k.
Note the terminology: an outcome is discarded by a Newcombian State.
The operation of discarding corresponds to the player’s behavior described
in the principles:
– With the first principle, if, predicting outcome o will happen, she moves
to a subtree with outcomes that are all better than o, then o is discarded
and is no longer an equilibrium candidate.
– With the second principle, the player selects a move, which discards any
outcome in the other subtrees.
Example 9 For example in the Γ -game, at the root, i.e. step 2, the target
functions for the pure Newcombian states are T2(n1) = {o3, o4} and T2(n2) =
{o7, o8, o9, o10, o11} (they contain all descendants). The corresponding discard-
ing functions are P2(n1) = ∅ and P2(n2) = {o4}. Knowing this, it is pos-
sible to compute the target functions of the Newcombian states of order 1:
T2(n2, n1) = T2(n2) \ P2(n1) = T2(n2) and T2(n1, n2) = T2(n1) \ P2(n2) =
{o3, o4} \ {o4} = {o3}.
There are two extreme cases for discarding:
14 An outcome is said worse than another outcome if and only if it gives a lower payoff
with respect to the current player pci−1 .
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– If Ti(p) = ∅, or if there is no η1-targeted outcome worse than the worst
p-targeted outcome, then Ti(η) = Ti(η1). Discarding η1-targeted outcomes
by p is ineffective.
– If all η-targeted outcomes are worse than the worst p-targeted outcome,
then Ti(η) = ∅. This time, discarding the descendance of η1 by p is at its
highest efficiency, since p discards every η1-targeted outcome. η is called a
degenerate state. A degenerate state cannot discard any outcome.
It is only for a degenerate state η that it is ambiguous which principle
is being applied: the first one (the outcomes in Pi(p) are preempted) or
the second one (the player moves rationally to the pure part of η). For
non-degenerate states, only the first principle makes sense.
3.2.4 Example
Fig. 9 The Γ -game with Newcombian states and their targeted/discarded outcomes at the
root.
At step 1 of game Γ , we have c1 = n0 and I1 = {all outcomes} (initial
values).
At step 2, we compute the target functions of the Newcombian States:
T2(n1) = {o3, o4}
T2(n2) = {o7, o8, o9, o10, o11}
P2(n1) = ∅
T2(n2, n1) = T2(n2)
P2(n2) = {o4}
T2(n1, n2) = T2(n1) \ P2(n2) = {o3, o4} \ {o4} = {o3}
Perfect Prediction Equilibrium 23
P2(n1, n2) = {o8}
T2(n2, n1, n2) = T2(n2) \ P2(n2)
= {o7, o8, o9, o10, o11} \ {o8} = {o7, o9, o10, o11}
P2(n2, n1, n2) = {o3, o4}
T2(n1, n2, n1, n2) = T2(n1) \ P2(n2, n1, n2) = {o3, o4} \ {o3, o4} = ∅.
The entire reasoning (also at n2 and n6) is indicated on Fig. 9, where the
order of the sub-steps is indicated by the numbers in gray circles. Sub-steps
1, 2 and 3 are performed by Peter at n0. One notices that, by discarding all
outcomes we can, we are left with outcomes o7, o9, o10 and o11, and all of
them are descendants of n2, which is chosen by Peter (c2 = n2 and I2 =
{o7, o9, o10, o11}). Sub-steps 4 and 5 are then performed by Mary at n2 and
Sub-step 6 at n6 by Peter. Actually, it always works in the same way, at each
step and for any game: we can discard the outcomes of all subtrees but one,
as demonstrated in the next part.
3.2.5 The current player’s move
In the example, we saw that after discarding as many outcomes as possible at
the root, only outcomes in exactly one subtree remained - this means that this
subtree corresponds to the player’s next move. We will now show that at any
node reached by the game, the current player’s move exists and is unique.
Having constructed all Newcombian States at step i, a certain amount of
outcomes, having been discarded, are impossible. We consider all the outcomes
that are still available after this: these are the outcomes that are immune
against their knowledge up to the current step.
The set Ii ⊂ Ii−1 of all remaining outcomes is given by:
Ii = Ii−1 \ (
⋃
η
Pi(η))
Note that this infinite union is merely a notation, and represents in fact a
finite union, since all the Pi(η) are subsets of Ii−1 (and the set of subsets of a
finite set is finite). Nevertheless, despite being practical, this notation does not
allow to create any algorithm for computing the equilibrium. We will present
another characterization of the current player’s move which permits this in
Section 7.1.2.
Example 10 In the Γ -game, after reasoning at the root, the set of remain-
ing outcomes is I2 = I1 \ (P2(n1) ∪ P2(n2) ∪ P2(n1, n2) ∪ P2(n2, n1) ∪ ...) =
{o7, o9, o10, o11}. Note that it is impossible to algorithmically compute the in-
finite union with this formula, but the result is obtained by noticing that all
other outcomes have been discarded, and these four remaining outcomes can-
not be discarded by any of the two principles: they are all better for Peter
than any outcome in any other subtree.
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Lemma 1 Existence and uniqueness of current player’s move
1. (Existence of the current player’s move) There is at least one outcome
which has not been discarded during the process:
Ii = Ii−1 \ (
⋃
η
Pi(η)) 6= ∅
2. (Uniqueness of the current player’s move) All remaining outcomes are the
descendants of one unique offspring of the last player’s move ci−1:
∃!f ∈ F (ci−1), Ii ∩D(f) 6= ∅
and this very offspring is the current player’s move ci:
{ci} ≡ {f ∈ F (ci−1), Ii ∩D(f) 6= ∅}
Example 11 If we continue with the example above, we see that all remaining
outcomes (o7, o9, o10, o11) are descendants of n2. This implies that c2 = n2.
Now that all outcomes in all subtrees but one have been discarded, the
game reaches ci: whatever outcome in Ii is anticipated, the players play to-
wards ci. Hence, the reasoning can continue at this node, at which further
outcomes can be discarded.
3.2.6 End of recursion - Definition and Theorem
When the path reaches an outcome cd (Id = {cd}), the induction stops, leaving
one non-discarded outcome.
Example 12 In the Γ -game, at step 3, the game reaches c3 = n6 with the
remaining outcomes I3 = {o9, o11}. At step 4, it reaches c4 = o11 with I4 =
{o11}. The induction stops here: o11 is reached by the game. (n0, n2, n6, o11) is
the equilibrium: under the assumption of total transparency, the players will
reach it; even though they know it in advance, they never deviate. Actually,
the fact that they know it in advance causes them to reach it.
Definition 4 (Perfect Prediction Equilibrium) In a game in extensive form
represented by a finite tree, with perfect information, without chance moves
and with strict preferences between the outcomes, under the assumption of
total transparency, a Perfect Prediction Equilibrium is a path leading to a
non-discarded outcome, i.e., an outcome which is immune against the CK
that the players have of it: the players, anticipating it, have no interest in
modifying their choices and do play towards this outcome. It is a fixpoint, in
that it follows causally from its prediction.
Theorem 1 (Existence and uniqueness of the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium)
In a game in extensive form represented by a finite tree, with perfect informa-
tion, without chance moves and with strict preferences between the outcomes,
there is one unique Perfect Prediction Equilibrium.
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3.3 Pareto optimality
The Perfect Prediction Equilibrium has the additional property of always being
Pareto-optimal. This concept is of crucial importance in economics. In our case,
it means that when the PPE is reached, the payoffs are distributed so that
no other equilibrium can make a player better off without making the other
player worse off.
Theorem 2 The outcome of the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium is Pareto-
optimal among the outcomes of the game.
Note that, although the PPE is always Pareto-optimal, it is not always
a Pareto improvement of the SPE (for a counterexample, see the complete
analysis of biped games in the Appendix, case “1 6=” with d = 1 and f = 0).
4 Related Work
4.1 The Backward Induction Paradox
In the last decades, there has been a debate around the so-called Backward
Induction Paradox: CK of rationality is also assumed at nodes that are known
to be not reached given this very CK of rationality. This points out that in
some way, the SPE is not completely transparent to itself: the players do know
their respective strategies, and though cannot be fully – that is, at all nodes in
the tree – cognizant of the final equilibrium determined by these two strategies.
One of the motivations behind the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium is to
avoid the Backward Induction Paradox (BIP). In this section, we show how
literature relates the BIP to the assumption of counterfactual independence
and hence, why giving up this assumption circumvents the BIP.
Two kinds of BIPs can be found in literature.
Pettit and Sugden (1989) describe an empirical BIP with the example of
the prisoner’s dilemma (a game with imperfect information): “There is a well-
known argument – the backward induction argument – to the effect that, in
such a sequence, agents who are rational and who share the belief that they are
rational will defect in every round. This argument holds however large n may
be. And yet, if n is a large number, it appears that I might do better to follow
a strategy such as tit-for-tat. [...] This is the backward induction paradox.”
Baltag et al (2009) describe a more fundamental, logical BIP as follows: “in
order even to start the reasoning, a player assumes that (common knowledge
of, or some form of common belief in) rationality ’ holds at all the last decision
nodes (and so the obviously irrational leaves are eliminated); but then, in
the next reasoning step (going backward along the tree), some of these (last)
decision nodes are eliminated, as being incompatible with (common belief
in) rationality !” Reny (1992) showed that in the Take-or-Leave game, CK of
rationality is self-contradictory at each node outside of the equilibrium path.
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In the last two decades, the Backward Induction Paradox has been the ob-
ject of an uninterrupted debate. On the one side, Aumann (1995) proved that
“common knowledge of rationality (CKR) implies [that players are reasoning
by] backward induction.” (although he does not “claim that CKR obtains or
should obtain”). On the other side, Stalnaker states that “Common knowledge
of substantive15 rationality does not imply the backwards induction solution”
(Halpern 2001) and argued (Stalnaker 1998) that Aumann’s argument “con-
flates epistemic16 and causal independence, implicitly making a strong epis-
temic independence assumption which it explicitly rejects.” The opposition to
Aumann’s claim was supported by (Binmore 1996) and (Binmore 1997).
Halpern (2001) showed that both sides are right, in that “the key difference
between Aumann and Stalnaker lies in how they interpret” the counterfactual’
statement “for all vertices v, if the player were to reach vertex v, then the player
would be rational at vertex v” (substantive rationality), i.e., whether it is a
material17 or a counterfactual implication18.
Baltag et al (2009) go in another direction by allowing players to have“a
moment of temporary irrationality.”
We believe that the Backward Induction Paradox is due to the lack of
transparency arising from the widespread assumption that present decisions
are counterfactually independent of past moves, an assumption also made ex-
plicitly by Baltag et al (2009): “players have no non-trivial “hard” information
about the outcomes [...]: they cannot foretell the future, cannot irrevocably
know the players’ freely chosen future moves (though they do irrevocably know
the past, and they may irrevocably know the present [...])”.
Perfection prediction theory aims at giving an alternate game-theoretical
solution concept with the exact opposite assumption: there is CK of the out-
come of the game, and the past is counterfactually dependent on this outcome.
There is also CK of rationality on the equilibrium path, and no need for it
outside of this path (no counterfactuals on (un)reached nodes, no substantive
rationality).
This happens to lead to cooperative, Pareto-optimal behavior. Hence, the
Backward Induction Paradox, in the two formulations given above, does not
manifest itself in the PPE theory.
Supporting the possibility of having an alternate theory of rational choice,
Kreps (2009) argues that “when one says “rational choice theory”, it sounds
as if only one theory or model of choice could qualify. How could two distinct
theories or models both be rational? But people behave in different ways, de-
pending on the specific context and the more general social situation, and I
see no reason to privilege one universal model of behavior with the adjective
rational. To do so is, if not demonstrably silly, at least demonstrably mislead-
ing.”
15 At all vertices in the game. This is the definition used by Halpern (2001).
16 We call this counterfactual independence.
17 i.e., equivalent to “the players do not reach vertex v, or they are rational at vertex v”
18 i.e., “if [the player] were to actually reach v, then what he would do in that case would
be rational” (Halpern 2001)
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4.2 Super-Rationality
Hofstadter (1983) introduced the concept of super-rationality like so: ”Super-
rational thinkers, by recursive definition, include in their calculations the fact
that they are in a group of super-rational thinkers.” Super-rationality is defined
for symmetric games. We believe that the one-boxer rationality underlying the
PPE is the equivalent of super-rationality for games in extensive form, as it
shares the core idea of transcending rationality, in that players include the
knowledge thereof in their calculations.
Shiffrin et al (2009) argue that rationality is ”not a normative concept but
rather a social consensus of a sufficiently large proportion of humans judged
to be sufficiently expert.” They point out that normative game theory reaches
non-(Parent)-efficient optima and initiated research to suggest an alternate
equilibrium concept that aims at being Pareto-optimal and that differs from
the Nash equilibrium. They explicitly point to Hofstadter’s super-rationality
as a starting point. Also, they compare their approach to a single player’s
playing against himself under the effect of the Midazolam drug, which makes
him forget his past decisions while preserving his reasoning abilities. It can
be taken from the draft that, unlike the PPE, no preemption structure is
considered. Also, they are facing an exponential explosion of the search space
for more than 2 players. The PPE scales to any number of players with the
same algorithms.
4.3 Forward Induction
The Perfect Prediction Equilibrium is de facto built with a forward induction,
since its construction begins at the root and ends at an outcome. Note that, in
game theory, the expression “Forward Induction” carries much more meaning
than the fact that the reasoning follows a path from the root to an outcome.
Although in the past many Forward Induction Equilibria have been de-
signed, according to Govindan and Wilson (2008), “the literature provides no
formal definition of Forward Induction.”
We now compare our equilibrium with others found in literature by first
looking at differences and then at similarities.
First of all, we limit ourselves to games with perfect information, meaning
that information sets are all singletons, so that beliefs (as they are defined in
the Sequential Equilibria of Kreps and Wilson (1982)) are the trivial function
1 on a singleton.
Additionally, Forward Induction is often used with mixed strategies leading
to probability distribution over the game outcomes. Usually, Forward Induc-
tion seems to select an equilibrium among the Sequential Equilibria as defined
by Kreps and Wilson (1982). In our work we only consider pure strategies,
with pure game outcomes.
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Finally, there is the issue of what happens outside of the path. It has
already been addressed, for example in the Weakly Sequential Equilibrium by
Kreps and Wilson (1982), where strategies are required to be optimal only
on non-excluded information sets (but are defined also on information sets
excluded by these very strategies). Cho and Kreps (1987) introduced signaling
games, in which they also address this issue: “If one can restrict the out-of-
equilibrium beliefs (or hypotheses) of B, one can sometimes eliminate many of
the equilibria.” We find the same idea in the work of Banks and Sobel (1987):
“This section presents an equilibrium concept that refines the set of sequential
equilibria in signaling games by placing restrictions on off-the-equilibrium-
path beliefs”. In our case, pure strategies are simply not defined at all outside
the equilibrium path. Actually, outside the equilibrium path, it is not even
assumed that players are rational.
In spite of these differences (perfect information, pure strategies, no defini-
tion outside of the equilibrium path), we can find some interesting similarities
with existing Forward Induction Equilibria.
It is commonly assumed that past play was rational, as opposed to back-
ward induction, where future play only is supposed to be rational. See for
example Govindan and Wilson (2008): “Kohlberg and Mertens label this re-
sult Forward Induction but they and other authors do not define the criterion
explicitly. The main idea is the one expressed by Hillas and Kohlberg in their
recent survey: “Forward induction involves an assumption that players assume,
even if they see something unexpected, that the other players chose rationally
in the past”, to which one can add that ‘and other players will choose ra-
tionally in the future.’ This is implicit since rationality presumes that prior
actions are part of an optimal strategy.” We also assume rationality of other
players in the past, but even more than that, we assume that the past has
a power of preemption. Technically, in occurring time for example, it could
mean that if a player (she) chooses a move towards a preempted outcome,
knowing that the other player (he) anticipated this outcome, this contradicts
his rationality in the past, hence, she cannot choose such a move.
Preemption has also already been indirectly used in Forward Induction:
e.g., by Cho and Kreps (1987): “Again envisaging the thought process of the
players, we have in mind something like Kohlberg and Merten’s process of
forward induction: will some type of player A, having arrived introspectively
at restrictions in B’s beliefs (hence B’s conceivable actions), see that deviation
will lead to a higher payoff than will following the equilibrium?”
CK of the equilibrium has already been considered as well: Cho and Kreps
(1987): “An equilibrium is meant to be a candidate for a mode of self-enforcing
behavior that is common knowledge among the players. (Most justifications for
Nash equilibria come down to something like this. See, for example Aumann
[1987] or Kreps [forthcoming]). In testing a particular equilibrium (or equilib-
rium outcome), one holds to the hypothesis that the equilibrium (outcome) is
common knowledge among the players, and one looks for “contradictions”.”
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This is exactly what we do in PPE: it is the only equilibrium stable against
its CK. In our case, it is unique and all other paths lead to contradictions.
Note that Govindan and Wilson (2008) also give a proposal for a Forward
Induction criterion with mixed strategies and without the perfect informa-
tion assumption: “Definition 3.4 (Forward Induction). An outcome satisfies
forward induction if it results from a weakly sequential equilibrium in which
at every relevant information set the support of the belief of the player acting
there is confined to profiles of nature’s strategies and other players’ relevant
strategies.” Although the framework is different, it can be interesting to ask
whether the PPE fulfills this criterion, knowing that we are in the special case
where we have perfection information and pure strategies which are a special
case of mixed strategies, and where the ’knowledge’ of each player can be seen
as beliefs with probability 1.
The Sequential Equilibrium is close to the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium:
in (Kreps and Wilson 1982), Proposition 3 says: “if (µ, pi) is a Sequential
Equilibrium, then pi is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.” Since the PPE
is not always an SPE, it is not always a Sequential Equilibrium either.
Now, the Weakly Sequential Equilibrium is more general than the Sequen-
tial Equilibrium, in that players’ strategies do not need to be optimal at in-
formation sets excluded by the equilibrium strategy. Unfortunately, this is not
enough: a PPE is not always a WSE either. For example, in the assurance
game, the only WSE outcome is (0,0) whereas the PPE leads to its Pareto im-
provement (1,1). What happens with the WSE is that (1,1), which is the PPE
outcome, is already discarded at the beginning of the reasoning by the second
player who prefers (-1,2), and the first player then chooses (0,0) by backward
induction: there is no notion of preempting (-1,2), which would influence the
choice of the second player.
Hence, the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium is not a refinement of any of the
above equilibria. While using preemption and CK of the equilibrium outcome,
which are not new and have already been addressed in Forward Induction
literature, it deviates from the ideas behind the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
Although we can find the same intuitions in the Forward Induction litera-
ture and in the construction of the PPE, the literature still (implicitly) assumes
counterfactual independence of a player’s move from the past, whereas we are
using the concept of Perfect Prediction.
Starting with the premise that the game is played by agents for whom the
world is totally transparent, we established that exactly one equilibrium, the
Perfect Prediction Equilibrium, fulfills this requirement.
5 Conclusion
We introduced an alternate solution concept, the Perfect Prediction Equilib-
rium, which is reached by players that have a different form of rationality
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Table 1 A summary of the differences between the SPE and PPE paradigms
Subgame Perfect Perfect Prediction
Equilibrium Equilibrium
Form of the Game Extensive Extensive
Perfect Information Yes Yes
Number of players Any Any
Newcomb Choice Two boxes One box
Prediction Model Ad-Hoc Prediction Perfect Prediction
accounting for (“could have (“would also
counterfactuals been wrong”) have been right”)
Relationship with the Past Cournot-like Stackelberg-like
Reasoning Backward Induction Forward Induction
Indifference between payoffs Allowed Not allowed in principle
Existence Always Always
Uniqueness Always Always
Optimality - Pareto
Corresponding Nash Superrationality (not established/
Normal Form (subsuming) conceptually similar)
than that used in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. It accounts for the behavior
of players that would pick one box in Newcomb’s problem, as opposed to ra-
tional players in the Nash sense, that would pick two boxes with a dominant
strategy argument.
One-boxer-rational players seem to get a reward over two-boxer-rational
players, as the former can only reach Pareto-optimal outcomes.
Table 1 summarizes the differences between the SPE paradigm and the
PPE paradigm.
As a conclusive remark, it is important to note that, for the equilibrium to
be reached, it does not require that Perfect Prediction holds. It suffices that the
one-boxer rational players believe that it does. Furthermore, the algorithms
are simple and efficiently computable. The PPE can also be used by pragmatic
two-boxer-rational players to mutually agree on a settlement contract to get a
more efficient outcome than they would otherwise. Hence, even if an agent who
feels very strong about two-boxer-rationality will not find one-boxer-rationality
reasonable, they cannot deny that its benefits are quite reasonable.
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7 Annex - Preemption Structure and Algorithms
We proved that the current player’s move exists and is unique, but we did not
give an explicit way of determining how to compute it. In order to introduce
algorithms, we need a further analysis of the preemption structure. After giving
an explicit construction of the equilibrium, we derive two algorithms.
7.1 Preemption structure analysis - the explicit construction of the PPE
In this part, we first introduce Newcombian Classes for a given step i and
then give an explicit characterization of the player’s move at the corresponding
node.
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7.1.1 Newcombian Classes
Two Newcombian states with the same targeting function can be considered
equivalent.
Definition 5 (target-equivalent, Newcombian Class) With respect to step i,
two Newcombian States η and η′ are target-equivalent if they target the same
outcomes: Ti(η) = Ti(η
′).
This defines an equivalence relation on the set of all Newcombian States
relative to the same move: it is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. The equiva-
lence class of a Newcombian State η is denoted η̂ and is called the Newcombian
Class of η.
We naturally extend the target function Ti to Newcombian Classes: Ti(η̂) =
Ti(η), where η is any element of η̂.
If Ti(η̂) = ∅, η̂ is called a degenerate class.
Example 13 In the assurance game, T2(o1) = {o1} and T2(o1, n2) = {o1}.
This means that they belong to the same equivalence class: ô1 = ̂(o1, n2).
In particular, they can potentially discard the exact same outcomes. Also, in
the Γ -game, T2(n2, n1, n2, n1, n2) = T2(n2) since (n1, n2, n1, n2) is degenerate.
Hence ̂(n2, n1, n2, n1, n2) = n̂2.
Two target-equivalent Newcombian states (i) have the same pure part, (ii)
have an order like Newcombian classes and (iii) are characterized with their
worst payoff.
Definition 6 (pure part of a non-degenerate Newcombian Class) Two non-
degenerate target-equivalent Newcombian States always have the same pure
part: had they not, then they could not target the same outcomes. Conse-
quently, we can define the pure part of a non-degenerate Newcombian Class
as being the pure part of any of its elements: η̂1 ≡ η1, for any η ∈ η̂.
Definition 7 (order of a class) We call order of a class the minimum of the
orders of its elements.
Example 14 In the assurance game, the Newcombian Class ô1 ⊃ {o1, (o1, n2)}
is of order 1.
Definition 8 (worst payoff of a Newcombian Class) Let η̂ be a non-degenerate
Newcombian Class. The set of η̂-targeted outcomes is finite and non-empty.
Hence the current player’s payoff payoff i = a
pci−1
. has a minimum value on
this set, which is η̂’s worst payoff:
wp(η̂) = min
o∈Ti(η̂)
payoff i(o). (2)
Proposition 1 At any step i, a non-degenerate Newcombian Class is charac-
terized by its worst payoff.
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Example 15 In the assurance game, at step 2, ̂(n2, o1) is characterized by pay-
off 1.
Remark 1 As in Definition 8, we could define the best payoff of a non-dege-
nerate class, but in the general case, we may have different classes with the
same best payoff. The best payoff does not characterize a class.
Finally, the combination of Newcombian states (i.e., building a new, higher-
order state with a node as the pure part and a Newcombian state as the
discarding part) translates naturally to Newcombian classes.
Proposition 2 Given a move m ∈ F (ci−1) and a Newcombian Class ηˆ, the
Newcombian Class of (m, η) is the same for all representants η of ηˆ. Conse-
quently, one can define
(m, ηˆ) = (̂m, η)
for any η ∈ ηˆ.
Example 16 In the assurance game, (n2, ô1) = ̂(n2, o1) (characterized by its
worst outcome 1).
7.1.2 The (explicit) current player’s move
We now give another formula to compute the next move, which is equiva-
lent to the one given in Definition 1 (the current player’s move exists and is
unique), with the difference that here the proof gives its explicit construction
(the corresponding Newcombian State and the remaining, targeted outcomes).
This is necessary for the general algorithm to explicitly compute the Perfect
Prediction Equilibrium and also to determine the minimum level used in the
quick algorithm (Section 7.2.2).
Proposition 3 Let η̂(i) be the only class that discards any outcome targeted
by the brothers of its pure part (η̂(i) is also called best Newcombian Class19 at
step i):
∀n ∈ F (ci−1) \ {pure(η̂(i))} : Ti(n, ηˆ(i)) = ∅ (3)
This class η̂(i) exists and is unique.
Example 17 In the assurance game, T2(o1, n2, o1) = ∅ so that ̂(n2, o1) is the
class we are looking for. In the Γ -game, T2(n1, n2, n1, n2) = ∅ so that ̂(n2, n1, n2)
is the class that discards any outcome in the other subtrees than that of its
pure part.
19 It is actually the maximum of a a total order relation. A partial order relation can be
defined on all Newcombian States, and Newcombian Classes are defined so as to make this
relation a relation of total order on them.
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Now, if we consider any node n ∈ F (ci−1)\{pure(η̂(i))}, i.e. any brother
of η̂
(i)
1 , then every n-targeted outcome is worse than the worst η̂
(i)-targeted
outcome, in other words n’s best payoff is lower than η̂(i)’s worst payoff.
At this stage, the second principle concludes that the current player moves
on to the pure part of η̂(i). Later on, a player can only consider outcomes in
Ti(η̂
(i)), because had player pci−1 anticipated another outcome, he would have
deviated.
Proposition 4 Then:
– the current player’s move is ci = pure(η̂
(i))
– the remaining outcomes are Ii = Ti(η̂
(i))
Example 18 In the assurance game, c2 = pure(n2, o1) = n2 and I2 = T2(n2, o1)
= {o4}. In the Γ -game, c2 = pure(n2, n1, n2) = n2 and I2 = T2(n2, n1, n2) =
{o7, o9, o10, o11}.
7.1.3 An illustration of the constructions used in the proofs
The proof of existence in Proposition 3 gives us an explicit algorithm to com-
pute the current player’s move. The main idea is to recursively (over k) com-
pute the Newcombian Class η̂
(i)
(k) of order k which has the highest worst payoff.
At some point, one of these Newcombian Classes η̂(i) is the one we are looking
for.
The following example shows this construction.
Example 19 In game Γ , at step 2 (remember that step 1 is directly defined,
because the game starts at the root), with respect to Peter (Fig. 9):
There are two Newcombian Classes of order 1: n̂1 and n̂2. Their worst
payoffs with respect to Peter are, respectively, −1, and 0. n̂2 has the highest
worst payoff. Hence η̂
(2)
(1) = n̂2.
There is only one Newcombian Classes of order 2: ̂(n1, n2). ̂(n2, n1) is not of
order 2, because in fact it is equal to the class n̂1. Hence we have η̂
(2)
(2) =
̂(n1, n2).
We proceed by iteration:
η̂
(2)
(1) = n̂2 and the highest worst payoff is 1 (in n1’s subtree),
η̂
(2)
(2) =
̂(n1, n2) and the highest worst payoff is 2 (in n2’s subtree),
η̂
(2)
(3) =
̂(n2, n1, n2),
and finally since T1(n1, n2, n1, n2) = ∅, we have η̂(2)(3) = ̂(n2, n1, n2) = η̂(2).
Finally, the proof of uniqueness in Proposition 3 provides us with a quick
algorithm to determine the current player’s move - but by skipping the pro-
cedure described in the proof of existence in Proposition 3, we cannot tell the
order of the move, only its worst payoff and the targeted outcomes.
Therefore the preemption structure analysis indeed leads to the same re-
sults as the original definition, and it is a powerful tool which provides us with
two algorithms to compute the equilibrium.
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Fig. 10 Illustration of the quick algorithm to determine step 2 in Game Γ .
7.2 The algorithms
In this part the reader will find two algorithms computing the PPE as pre-
sented in part 3 (see Fig. 9 and 10):
- the general algorithm determines completely the Newcombian structure
leading to each current player’s move. It has been directly derived from the
proof of existence in Proposition 3, so that this proof is a proof of correctness
for the algorithm.
- the quick algorithm calculates directly the set of remaining outcomes at
each current player’s move by choosing the branch with the best outcome and
eliminating all outcomes below some minimum level. This algorithm has been
directly derived from the proof of uniqueness in Proposition 3, so that this
proof is also a proof of correctness for the algorithm.
Both algorithms run in polynomial time with respect to the size of the tree.
7.2.1 General algorithm
This algorithm computes explicitly all intermediate discardings. It runs in
O(n3d) where n is the number of nodes and leaves in the tree and d its depth.
The equilibrium path is called (ci)i=1..d.
The algorithm is initialized with:
c1 = n0 (the root)
I1 = {all outcomes of the game}
Then a finite induction on i gives all (ci)i=1..d and all (Ii)i=1..d:
at each step i, a finite induction on k gives a series of Newcombian States:
{η̂(i)(1)} = arg max
η̂
order(η̂)=1
min
o∈Ti(η̂)
payoff i(o)
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{η̂(i)(k+1)} = arg max
η̂
η̂=
̂
(n,η
(i)
(k)
)
n∈F (ci−1)\{η̂(i)(k)1}
Ti(η̂) 6=∅
min
o∈Ti(η̂)
payoff i(o)
and stops at some k, giving η̂
(i)
(k) = η̂
(i)
Then
– the current player’s move is ci = pure(η̂
(i))
– the remaining outcomes are Ii = Ti(η̂
(i))
The induction ends when the path reaches an outcome:
Id = {cd}
7.2.2 Quick algorithm
This algorithm calculates the equilibrium path without using the preemption
structure. It runs in O(nd) where n is the number of nodes and leaves in the
tree and d its depth.
o ← the root of the tree
While(o is not an outcome)
p ← current player at node o
s ← the subtree starting at an offspring of o
with the maximum payoff for player p
If(there are other subtrees than s)
M ← player p’s maximum payoff in the other subtrees than s
Eliminate all other subtrees than s
Discard in s all outcomes with a payoff lower than M for player p
Clean the tree (remove all interrupted paths)
o ← the root of s
Return o
Example 20 An example of application of this algorithm at the root is shown
on Fig. 10. Peter’s highest payoff is at the n2-targeted outcome o10: 5. Among
the brothers of n2, the subtree at n1 has the highest best payoff: 1. We dis-
card all n2-targeted outcomes whose payoff with respect to Peter are lower
than 1: o8. We get the same next move c2 = n2 and the same set I2 =
{o7, o9, o10, o11}as by doing the full procedure at step 2 (Fig. 9)
8 Annex - Proofs of Lemmas, Theorems and Propositions
Proof (Lemma 1) We prove each of the three points:
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1. The outcome in Ii−1 with the highest payoff for the current player pci−1 :
arg max
o∈Ii−1
a
pci−1
o
cannot be discarded by a Newcombian State η. Its payoff would namely have
to be lower than the worst outcome of a non-empty subset Ti(η) of Ii−1, which
is in contradiction with its definition.
2. Let us suppose that Ii contains at least two outcomes descending from
two different offsprings of ci−1.
Let om be the worst outcome for pci−1 in Ii and fm its ancestor among the
offsprings of ci−1. We will show that om should have been discarded and so
cannot be in Ii.
By assumption, there is another offspring fp 6= fm of ci−1, with at least
one outcome which has not been discarded - let op be the worst one of those,
and (fp, η) a Newcombian State. Because op is not discarded, op ∈ Ti(fp, η).
By definition of om and because of the strict preference between two outcomes,
om is strictly worse than op (which is the worst outcome in Ti(fp, η)), thus is
preempted by (fp, η).
This is in contradiction with the fact that om ∈ Ii. 
Proof (Theorem 1) The induction presented in Lemma 1 discards all outcomes
but one. Furthermore, no other reasoning can discard this last outcome. The
two players, having anticipated it, have no interest in modifying their choices
and will play towards this outcome. 
Proof (Theorem 2)
Suppose the outcome of the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium o is not Pareto-
optimal. Then there must be some outcome oP , which Pareto-improves o:
aPetero < a
Peter
oP
aMaryo < a
Mary
oP
(Both inequalities are strict because of the strict preferences).
This outcome oP has been discarded at some move i by a Newcombian
State η of order k.
One of two:
- either o ∈ T (η), in which case the current player’s payoff at o is greater
than (or equal to) η’s worst payoff
- or o /∈ T (η), but since o was not discarded at that stage, the current
player’s payoff at o is necessarily strictly greater than η’s worst payoff
Since the current player’s payoff at op is lower than η’s worst payoff, in
both cases, we have contradicted the above inequalities. 
Proof (Proposition 1) Given a payoff x, there is only one outcome o that will
give x to the current player, in virtue of the assumption that all payoffs are
different. If two nodes n and n′ in F (ci−1) are different, then they cannot
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target the same outcome: n 6= n′ ⇒ Ti(n) ∩ Ti(n′) = ∅. Hence there is a
unique node n in F (ci−1) such that outcome o is the descendant of node n.
There is only one Newcombian Class whose pure part is n and whose worst
payoff is x. This is because the Newcombian State p discards all outcomes
worse than the worst p-targeted outcome, whereas all better outcomes are
not discarded. Hence the required Newcombian Class is defined by the set of
n-targeted outcomes whose payoffs are greater than or equal to x. 
Proof (Proposition 2) Discarding only depends on the worst outcome of the
discarding Newcombian State. 
Proof (Proposition 3) (Existence and uniqueness of move η̂(i))
Uniqueness: The pure part n of the class η̂(i) necessarily targets the out-
come with the highest payoff with respect to the current player. If not, then
η̂(i) could not discard precisely this outcome with the highest payoff, which
contradicts the definition of η̂(i).
Among the brothers of n, we call m the node which has the highest best
payoff. Then η̂(i)’s worst payoff is the minimum of the payoffs of the n-targeted
outcomes, which are (strictly) greater than m’s best payoff. A reason for it is
that it is the minimum level to discard all outcomes targeted by the brothers
of n. And it cannot be higher, since there is no other class which could have
discarded the outcome relative to this value.
According to Proposition 1, η̂(i) is fully determined by its worst payoff.
Existence: let us define a procedure based on several little steps k, which
are to be distinguished from the step i. With respect to step i, we define the
best Newcombian Class of order k denoted η̂
(i)
(k) by induction on little step
k.
Let us begin with k = 1. The best Newcombian Class of order 1, η̂
(i)
(1), is
the Newcombian Class of order 1 with the highest worst payoff. This class ex-
ists, since Newcombian Classes of order 1 are identified with nodes in F (ci−1),
which are all non-degenerate. Their worst payoffs are all distinct (see Propo-
sition 1), so η̂
(i)
(1) is unique.
{η̂(i)(1)} = arg max
η̂
order(η̂)=1
min
o∈Ti(η̂)
payoff i(o) (4)
Suppose now we have defined η̂
(i)
(k) for some k ≥ 1. We have to distinguish
between two cases:
1. Either η̂
(i)
(k) discards any outcome targeted by the brothers of its pure
part pure(η̂
(i)
(k)), so the procedure is over and we have reached η̂
(i) = η̂
(i)
(k).
2. Or there are still some brothers n of pure(η̂
(i)
(k)), such that (n, η̂
(i)
(k)) is
not degenerate. Then, by definition, the best Newcombian class η̂
(i)
(k+1) of order
k + 1 will be the non-degenerate class (n, η̂
(i)
(k)) with the highest worst payoff.
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As for η̂
(i)
(1), this class exists and is unique, because it is the maximum of the
injective function wp on a finite set:
{η̂(i)(k+1)} = arg max
η̂
η̂=(n,η̂
(i)
(k)
)
n∈F (ci−1)\{pure(η̂(i)(k))}
Ti(η̂) 6=∅
min
o∈Ti(η̂)
payoff i(o) (5)
For each n ∈ F (ci−1) \ {pure(η̂(i)(k))}, because (n, η̂(i)(k)) is non-degenerate,
there are some n-targeted outcomes which have not been discarded by η̂
(i)
(k), i.e,
wp((n, η̂
(i)
(k))) > wp(η̂
(i)
(k)). Since η̂
(i)
(k+1) is one of these (n, η̂
(i)
(k)), wp(η̂
(i)
(k+1)) >
wp(η̂
(i)
(k)).
Since the set of outcomes is finite, the sequence (wp(η̂
(i)
(k)))k≥1 cannot in-
crease indefinitely: we will necessarily reach case 1 for some finite k. This shows
the existence of η̂(i). 
Proof (Proposition 4) (Equivalent definitions of ci and Ii)
Let us denote ci and Ii as the current player’s move and the set of the
not-yet-discarded outcomes as defined in Lemma 1, and let us denote c′i and
I ′i as they are suggested in Proposition 4.
In the uniqueness proof of η̂(i) we mentioned that c′i necessarily targets
the outcome o with the highest payoff with respect to the current player. This
very outcome cannot be discarded, hence o ∈ Ii. According to Lemma 1, all
outcomes in Ii, thus o as well, are the descendants of ci. Hence ci = c
′
i.
Ii is defined as the set of all the outcomes that cannot be discarded at step
i. First, we have Ii ⊂ I ′i since a non-discarded outcome at step i must be a
descendant of ci (Lemma 1) and has to be targeted by the best Newcombian
Class (because it is not discarded).
Then, we have I ′i ⊂ Ii: all outcomes in I ′i cannot be discarded by anything,
because the worst of them is strictly greater than the best outcome among the
descendants of the brothers of ci (Uniqueness proof of Proposition 3).
Hence, Ii = I
′
i as well. 
9 Annex - Biped Games: complete analysis
In this section, we perform a complete analysis of biped games and investigate
when the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is the same as the Perfect Prediction
Equilibrium and when it is not.
In our framework, only the order relation (preferences) between the out-
comes for each player is relevant, so that without loss of generality we can
assume that the payoffs are 0, 1 and 2 for each player. If we label the payoffs
(a, d), (b, e) and (c, f), we have 3!.3!2 = 18 different games. (We divide by two
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Fig. 11 Biped games: the four cases
because exchanging (b, e) and (c, f) does not change the game). Among these
18 games, we can distinguish four cases.
– Case 0 (a = 0, assuming e < f without loss of generality - 6 different
games). Both equilibria reach outcome 4. In the Subgame Perfect Equilib-
rium, if Mary plays at node 2, she will prefer outcome 4 which gives her
f, and Peter will get c. Since c > 0 (no indifference), Peter at node 0 will
choose node 2. In the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium, Peter cannot pre-
empt anything but outcome 1 (with node 2, since any outcome stemming
from node 2 is better than outcome 1) so that Mary can choose her favorite
outcome: outcome 4. This is the PPE.
– Case 1 (a = 1, assuming b = 0, c = 2 without loss of generality - 6 different
games). This case splits into two subcases:
– Case 1= (e < f , i.e., Mary has the same preferences as Peter at node 2).
Both equilibria reach outcome 4. In the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium,
Mary playing at node 2 chooses outcome 4. She gets f and Peter gets
2. Peter playing at node 0 will hence choose node 2. In the Perfect
Prediction Equilibrium, Peter preempts outcome 3 with outcome 0 and
then plays node 2. Mary has no choice but playing outcome 4.
– Case 1 6= (e > f , i.e., Mary has opposite preferences to Peter at node
2). The equilibria are different. In the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium,
Mary playing at node 2 chooses outcome 2. She gets e and Peter gets
0. Peter playing at node 0 will hence choose outcome 1, which is the
SPE. In the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium, Peter preempts outcome 3
with outcome 0 and then plays node 2. Mary has no choice but playing
outcome 4, which is the PPE.
– Case 2 (a = 2 - 6 different games). Both equilibria reach outcome 1. In
the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, whatever Mary plays at node 2, Peter
at node 0 will choose outcome 0 where he gets 2. In the Perfect Prediction
Equilibrium, Peter preempts with outcome 0 all outcomes stemming from
node 2 so that only outcome 0 remains. This is the PPE.
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Hence, it is interesting to see that for 15 biped games out of 18, the Sub-
game Perfect Equilibrium and the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium are the same.
Only 3 games lead to different equilibria.
For one of these three games (d = 0, e = 2, f = 1), the Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium encounters the Backward Induction Paradox (see Section 4.1),
which is solved by the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium. For the two other games
(d = 2, e = 1, f = 0 and d = 1, e = 2, f = 0), Peter’s preempting power
is also stronger than Mary’s propensity to deviate, leading though to a PPE
whose payoff is worse for Mary than at the SPE (o1).
10 Annex - The PPE as the solution of a first-order-logic equation
system
In this section, we present how a first-order-logic equation system can be built
for each game, so that the PPE is the unique solution to this system. This sets
up an unambiguous formal basis for defining the PPE.
The equations described in Section 10.5 induce a graph on the powerset
of the outcomes: each equation contributes an edge from a set of logically
impossible outcomes to a bigger set of logically impossible outcomes. Only the
equations indexed on a vertex in the connected component of the empty set
(i.e., all sets of logically impossible outcomes that can appear at all in any
step of a reasoning) are considered for the system. A reasoning can be seen
as a walk in the powerset graph induced by the first-order-logics equations,
starting at the empty set. There is a unique outcome which belongs to no set
in the connected component of the empty set, and this outcome is the outcome
of the PPE.
10.1 Framework
The framework is the same as in this paper. O is the set of all outcomes, N is
the set of all nodes, F (n) is the set of the children of node n. D(n) is the set
of the outcomes which are descendants of node n. P (n) is the parent of node
or outcome n. pn is the player playing at node n. a
o
p is the payoff of player p
at outcome o.
10.2 Reaction path of a tree (Second Principle)
For each tree T, we say that a path R = (ri)0≤i≤l starting at the root is a
reaction path of T if it fulfills the following conditions:
– r0 is the root.
– For any 0 < i ≤ l, ri ∈ F (ri−1)
– o ∈ D(rl)
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– (Second principle) For any 0 < i ≤ l: all outcomes in D(ri) are better than
all outcomes descending from the siblings of ri for the player at ri−1.
– It is maximal (there is no longer reaction path).
A non-empty tree always has exactly one reaction path (possibly simply
its root). This is denoted T −→ R. Since a path is uniquely identified by its
last node, we will also write T −→ rl. Note that rl (the last node in R) is not
necessarily an outcome.
10.3 Preempting reaction path of a tree to an outcome (First Principle)
For each tree T and each one of its outcomes o, we say that a path R = (ri)i
starting at the root is a preempting reaction path of T to o if it fulfills the
following conditions:
– (ri)i<l is a reaction path of T
– rl ∈ F (rl−1)
– o /∈ D(rl)
– (First principle) All outcomes in D(rl) are better than o for the player at
rl−1.
This is denoted T
o R. Since a path is uniquely identified by its last node,
we will also write T
o rl. Note that a preempting reaction path may not exist
given a tree and an outcome.
10.4 Outcome Powerset Graph
More precisely, we can organize all sets of outcomes (subsets of O) in a graph
as follows.
For each reaction path T \ U −→ r, there is an edge from U to U ⋃(O \
D(r)).
For each preempting reaction path T \ U o r, there is an edge from U to
U
⋃{o}.
The semantics of an edge is: if all outcomes on the left cannot be in the
solution, then all outcomes on the right cannot be either.
We call U the connected component of this graph containing the empty
set. This corresponds to the sets of eliminated outcomes actually reachable in
a reasoning.
10.5 The system of equations
Given a tree T, the system of equation is built as follows. Its unknowns are
the variables Sn for every node or outcome n in the tree. Sn is true if and only
if n is on the equilibrium path.
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The PPE is defined as the (unique) solution of the system of equations
((Cn)n∈(N∪O), (P 1e )e∈E1 , (P
2
e )e∈E2)
as follows.
10.5.1 The causal bridge equations
First, the equations maintaining the causal bridge are the following, for any
node or outcome n:
Sn ⇒ SP (n) ∧
∧
s∈F (P (n))\{n}
S¯s (Cn)
i.e., if a node or outcome is in the solution, then its parent should be as
well, and none of its siblings should be. This forces the solution to be a path
on the tree.
10.5.2 The second-principle equations
Secondly, the second-principle equations are indexed on indices (U, r) in the
subset E2 of U ×O corresponding to reaction paths T \ U −→ r:∧
p∈U
S¯p ⇒ Sr (P 2U,R)
10.5.3 The first-principle (preempting) equations
Finally, the first-principle equations are indexed on indices (U, o, r) in the
subset E1 of U×O×O corresponding to preempting reaction paths T \U o r:
(
∧
p∈U
S¯p) ∧ So ⇒ Sr (P 1U,o,R)
10.6 Example for the assurance game
There are five variables here: So = [root ∈ S], S1 = [(P,D) ∈ S], S2 =
[(P,C) ∈ S], S3 = [(M,D) ∈ S], S4 = [(M,C) ∈ S] (here we use edge labels
to allow comparison with Dupuy’s original equations).
The reaction paths (and the corresponding edges in the outcome powerset
graph) are:
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T −→ n0 contributing edge ∅ −→ ∅
T \ {o1} −→ o3 contributing edge {o1} −→ {o1, o4}
T \ {o3} −→ o4 contributing edge {o3} −→ {o1, o3}
T \ {o4} −→ o1 contributing edge {o4} −→ {o3, o4}
T \ {o1, o3} −→ o4 contributing edge {o1, o3} −→ {o1, o3}
T \ {o1, o4} −→ o3 contributing edge {o3, o4} −→ {o3, o4}
T \ {o3, o4} −→ o1 contributing edge {o3, o4} −→ {o3, o4}
(6)
In this example, only one preempting reaction path can be found:
T
o3 o1 contributing edge ∅ −→ {o3} (7)
The edges in the connected component of the empty set are marked in red.
∅
{ο1}{ο3} {ο4}
{ο1,ο3} {ο3,ο4} {ο1,ο4}
{ο1,ο3,ο4}
Fig. 12 The Outcome Powerset Graph for the promise game
Hence, the equations are:
Causal bridge
S0 ⇒ true (0 : C0)
S1 ⇒ S0 ∧ S¯2 (1 : C1)
S2 ⇒ S0 ∧ S¯1 (2 : C2)
S3 ⇒ S2 ∧ S¯4 (3 : C3)
S4 ⇒ S2 ∧ S¯3 (4 : C4)
First Principle
S3 ⇒ S1 (5 : P 1∅,o3,o1))
Second Principle
true⇒ S0 (6 : P 2∅,n0))
S¯3 ⇒ S4 (7 : P 2{o3},o4))
S¯1 ∧ S¯3 ⇒ S4 (8 : P 2{o1,o3},o4))
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Dupuy’s equations correspond to (5) and (7), which imply S0, S¯1, S2, S¯3, S4,
i.e., root ∈ S, (P,D) /∈ S, (P,C) ∈ S, (M,D) /∈ S and (M,C) ∈ S (this is our
equilibrium).
Let us show this again.
From (2) and (3), one can deduce S3 ⇒ S¯1, so that because of (5), S¯3.
From (7) one deduces S4, from (4) S2 and from (2) or (6), S0.
Is this a solution? With this assignment, the left part of (1), (3), (5) is
false, making these implications all true, and in (0), (2), (4), (6), (7), (8), the
left part is true, and the right part also, making the implications true as well.
Hence, it is proven that S0, S¯1, S2, S¯3, S4 is the one and only solution of
the system.
11 Annex - Link with Newcombian states
At step i of the reasoning presented in Section 3, given the eliminated outcomes
Ii−1, building a Newcombian state (η, p) corresponds to the following reasoning
(we abuse notations by using a node for its number).
For the first principle (preempting an outcome o), using equation
P 1(O\(Ii−1)∪Pi(discard(p)),o,η
and equation Co leads for So to be false.
For the second principle (choosing η), using equation
P 2(O\(Ii−1)∪Pi(discard(p)),η
and equation Cη leads for Sη to be true and for So to be false for each sibling
o of η .
12 Annex - The special case of invertible trees
The assurance game and Take-or-Leave game are special cases of games, which
are called invertible trees in Dupuy (2000). They were the starting point for
defining the PPE. Their trees detain a natural chronology: at each node, the
outcome below the node is in the present, whereas the previous node on the
left is in the past and the next one on the right is in the future.
For these games, the procedure is rather simple and we can give a simpler
version of the algorithm (but it derives from the same procedure as in the
general construction). At each node, starting from the root, the current player
compares the present outcome with the outcomes in the future:
1. if the present outcome is better than all outcomes in the future, the
procedure stops: the PPE outcome is the present one (the future outcomes are
all preempted by the present Take-move)
2. if all outcomes in the future are better than the present one, then the
player Leaves (the present outcome is preempted by the Leave-move)
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3. if some outcomes in the future are worse and some better than the
present outcome, then first all worse outcomes in the future are preempted
by the present Take-move, and then the present outcome is discarded like in
point 2.
